Someone’s conduct has crossed a line, or someone claims yours has, and a civil harassment restraining order (CHRO) has been filed. Now everything turns on a single legal question: does it count as “harassment”? The word gets used loosely in daily life for everything from rudeness to stalking, but Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 uses it precisely. Conduct that feels like harassment to the person living through it can fail the statute whereas conduct a respondent dismisses as a mere dispute can satisfy it.
This article addresses the definition of ‘harassment’ for a California civil harassment restraining order under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6. Other California laws, including domestic violence, workplace, criminal, and employment laws, use different standards.
It covers the three statutory routes to ‘harassment’, the elements of the course-of-conduct route, the limits on what a CHRO can restrain, the forward-looking requirement, and the cases that draw the line.
What Counts As Harassment: The Short Answer
Section 527.6 defines harassment as any one of three things: unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person and serves no legitimate purpose. For the third category, the statute adds a two-sided distress requirement which is that the course of conduct must be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner.
Unlawful violence and a credible threat can each rest on one single incident. The course-of- conduct route requires a series of acts over time showing continuity of purpose. Thus one act, however unpleasant, is not a course of conduct. Constitutionally protected activity cannot be counted as a course of conduct and substantial emotional distress is more than ordinary friction. A final CHRO is prospective relief, so the court must also have a factual basis to find a likelihood of recurrence.
The Three Categories That Qualify As Harassment
The three routes are alternatives and may overlap, but each has its own statutory requirements.
Unlawful violence means assault, battery, or stalking as defined in the criminal stalking statute. It does not include lawful self-defense or defense of others. One incident of assault, battery, or stalking can qualify so a pattern is not required.
A credible threat of violence is a knowing and willful statement or course of conduct that would place a reasonable person in fear for that person’s safety or the safety of an immediate family member, and that serves no legitimate purpose. One sufficiently serious threat can satisfy this route.
Course-of-conduct harassment is the third route and often the most contested. It requires a pattern of acts. It may overlap with violence or threats but one nonviolent, nonthreatening incident cannot establish this route.
The single-act line matters significantly in this area of law. One act of unlawful violence or one credible threat may support the issuance of a CHRO. One ugly confrontation, insult, or offensive scene without violence or a true threat is not a course of conduct. Sorting the facts into the right route is the first analytical move in these cases. (Leydon v. Alexander (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1.)
The Course-Of-Conduct Elements
For the course-of-conduct route, the petitioner must prove each required element by clear and convincing evidence at the hearing. The grid below summarizes them.
| Element | What It Requires | Key Authority |
|---|---|---|
| Knowing And Willful | Deliberate conduct; not accident or obliviousness. | § 527.6(b)(3) |
| Directed At A Specific Person | Aimed at the petitioner; targeting is fact-specific. | § 527.6(b)(3); Grant v Clampitt |
| A Course Of Conduct | Series of acts over time, however short, with continuity of purpose. | § 527.6(b)(1); Leydon v Alexander |
| Seriously Alarms, Annoys, Or Harasses | More than ordinary friction or transitory annoyance. | § 527.6(b)(3); Schild v. Rubin |
| No Legitimate Purpose | Challenged conduct, in context, lacks a legitimate purpose. | § 527.6(b)(3); Byers v. Cathcart |
| Would Distress A Reasonable Person | Objective: would cause substantial distress to a reasonable person. | § 527.6(b)(3); Schild v. Rubin |
| Actually Distresses The Petitioner | Subjective: petitioner actually suffered substantial distress. | § 527.6(b)(3); Ensworth v. Mullvain |
Knowing and willful. The pattern of conduct must be deliberate. Conduct that annoys by accident – for instance the neighbor genuinely unaware their habits disturb anyone – is generally not willful harassment. However, intent is inferred from the whole picture including warnings given and ignored or conduct that continues after its effect is unmistakable.
Directed at a specific person. The statute requires conduct aimed at the petitioner. Conduct aimed more generally at a neighborhood, organization, or public may be insufficient unless the facts show that the petitioner was a specific target. (Grant v. Clampitt (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 586, 591.)
A series of acts, with continuity of purpose. A course of conduct is a series of acts over a period of time, however short, showing continuity of purpose. The statute includes following or stalking, calls, and correspondence by mail or electronic means. One act cannot satisfy this route, but a short, intense sequence can. Scattered unpleasant incidents without a common thread make proof harder; a sequence with a clear common aim may show continuity of purpose.
Seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses, and Schild. In Schild v. Rubin, neighbors were upset by the noise of neighbor basketball occurring at reasonable times. The court held the evidence did not establish the statute’s substantial-emotional-distress requirements. The practical lesson is that ordinary neighborhood friction and reasonable use of property do not automatically become civil harassment. (Schild v. Rubin (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 755).
No legitimate purpose. A genuine underlying dispute can provide a reason to communicate, use property, or pursue a claim, but it is not a blanket defense. The question is whether the challenged conduct, in its manner and volume, served a legitimate purpose. Objectively legitimate conduct cannot be restrained merely because it is unwelcome.
Substantial emotional distress, both reasonable and subjective. The statute requires conduct that would cause a reasonable person substantial emotional distress and evidence that it actually caused substantial emotional distress to the petitioner. Medical or expert evidence is not required, but the evidence must show more than ordinary irritation or transitory stress.
Online conduct is measured by the same elements. A single post is not automatically a course of conduct, but repeated posts, messages, publication of contact information, or efforts to draw third-party contacts can matter (In E.G. v. M.L. (2024).
The Limits: What A CHRO Does Not Treat As Harassment
The statute expressly excludes constitutionally protected activity from the definition of a course of conduct and lawful self-defense or defense of others from the definition of unlawful violence. A related limit comes from the no-legitimate-purpose element of the law. A CHRO proceeding is not a substitute for deciding property, contract, eviction, or debt rights.
Constitutionally protected activity can include speech and petitioning, including some litigation-related communications. This protection is context-specific and does not create immunity for unlawful threats or a properly proven course of conduct. In Brekke v. Wills, the court held that abusive and threatening letters aimed at a mother on a private matter did not bar relief. In Hansen v. Volkov (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 94, litigation-related deposition emails could not be counted as a course of conduct and the remaining single incident was insufficient. A CHRO also cannot finally decide contested property or contract rights. In Byers v. Cathcart (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 805, the court reversed a restriction on parking because the record did not show that the parking lacked a legitimate purpose.
Lawful self-defense. Lawful self-defense or defense of others prevents that act from qualifying as unlawful violence under section 527.6. It does not decide whether separate conduct independently qualifies as a credible threat or a harassing course of conduct.
The Future-Looking Requirement: Injunctions Prevent, They Do Not Punish
A civil harassment restraining order is prospective or future relief. Although the statutory definition focuses on past conduct, the court must have a factual basis to conclude that harassment is reasonably likely to recur. The inquiry considers the conduct, its circumstances, and whether the precipitating circumstances still exist.
In Russell v. Douvan, the court reversed an order based on a single battery after an attorney followed opposing counsel into an elevator and grabbed his arm. The record did not show a likelihood of future harm. The point is not that one violent act can never support an order; it is that a final injunction must be protective, not punitive. (Russell v. Douvan (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 399, 402-04; Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484, 499-501; R.D. v. P.M. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 181, 189-90.)
For petitioners and respondents, the practical question is whether the record shows a current risk. So evidence of recency, escalation, ongoing contact, a pattern, or unchanged circumstances can support the likelihood of recurrence whereas a concluded incident with no likely future contact may not.
The Standard Of Proof, And What It Means Here
At the hearing, the court must find statutory harassment by clear and convincing evidence, meaning a high probability. A requested temporary restraining order (TRO) has a different threshold which is ‘reasonable proof of harassment and great or irreparable harm’. On appeal, the question is whether the record contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could have found the facts highly probable. (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989.)
As can be seen ‘harassment’ under section 527.6 is a term of art. The result usually turns on the correct statutory route, the quality of the evidence, and whether the facts support prospective relief.
Frequently Asked Questions About The Definition Of Harassment
What Legally Counts As Harassment In California? There are three alternative routes under section 527.6: unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person. The course-of-conduct route also requires serious conduct with no legitimate purpose and substantial emotional distress, both objectively and actually.
Can A Single Incident Be Harassment? A single assault, battery, stalking act, or credible threat can satisfy its own statutory route. A final order still requires a factual basis for likely future recurrence. A single nonviolent, nonthreatening incident cannot establish a course of conduct.
Is Annoying Behavior Enough? Not necessarily. Ordinary annoyance is not enough. The course-of-conduct route requires conduct that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses and substantial emotional distress, not the ordinary friction of life.
Does Free Speech Protect The Conduct? Sometimes. Constitutionally protected activity is excluded only from the course-of-conduct definition. The protection can include public speech, petitioning, and some litigation-related communications, but it does not create immunity for unlawful threats or a properly proven harassing course of conduct.
What If The Real Fight Is About Property Or Money? A real property or money dispute can be relevant, but a CHRO is not the procedure for finally deciding property, contract, eviction, or debt rights. It also cannot restrain objectively legitimate conduct. That does not mean an order is unavailable whenever a property or money dispute exists at the same time there is provable harassment.
Does Past Conduct Alone Justify An Order? Past conduct alone does not automatically justify a final order. The court must have a factual basis to conclude that harassment is reasonably likely to recur so repeated past conduct and unchanged circumstances may supply that basis.
This article provides general information and is not legal advice. Every case turns on its own facts and evidence. If you are experiencing harassment, or have been accused of it, consult a qualified attorney promptly.